Considering DPRK [North Korea] Regime Collapse: Its Probability
and Possible Geopolitical and Security Consequences. Security Policy Brief No. 66, August 2015 by Richey, Mason
Considering DPRK Regime Collapse: Its Probability 
and Possible Geopolitical and Security Consequences 
Mason Richey 
Both the EU and its member states are 
in a period of rethinking security strategy 
to adapt to contemporary challenges 
both in the European region and beyond, 
including Northeast Asia. In this 
Security Policy Brief, Mason Richey 
discusses what difficulties and risks a 
North Korean regime collapse would 
pose, the likelihood that it will occur 
sooner rather than later, and how Europe 
will be affected by such a scenario. 
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previously does not mean that we should not 
periodically review evidence about DPRK 
political stability. The question of DPRK 
collapse is important because it would radiate 
security consequences regionally and globally, 
including for Europe. In this Security Brief I 
first discuss the likely scenarios for DPRK 
dissolution, and then evaluate the available 
information concerning the stability of Kim 
Jong Un’s regime. Finally, I explain the 
geopolitical and security implications that a 
North Korean contingency would have, both 
globally/regionally and for Europe in 
particular.    
 
THE NORTH KOREA ENDGAME: 
POSSIBLE SCENARIOS AND WHY 
COLLAPSE IS LIKELY 
To begin, let us remember why North Korean 
collapse (and Korean unification) is the likely 
scenario on the Korean peninsula: quite 
simply, the alternatives are even more difficult 
to envision. Option (a) is Chinese-style reform 
and opening up. In many ways this would be a 
desirable course of action, and numerous 
countries, including China, have counseled 
North Korea’s leaders to undertake this 
process since the early 1990s. The Pyongyang 
regime has rejected this advice at every turn, 
precisely because it knows that the regime’s 
peculiar institutions, and the leaders who 
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Those who follow North Korea (DPRK) 
know that predicting the Pyongyang regime’s 
collapse is a fool’s game. Indeed many 
Pyongyangologists have acquired this 
knowledge by experience, having mistakenly 
forecasted regime failure as a consequence of 
any number of geopolitical or internal crises: 
the end of the Cold War, the first dynastic 
transition to Kim Jong Il's rule, the famine of 
the 1990s, tightening sanctions by the 
international community, the failed currency 
reform of 2009, or the second dynastic 
transition to Kim Jong Un.  
 
But the actual collapse will occur one day, 
perhaps sooner than expected. And just 
because experts have reported false positives 
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control them, would almost certainly lose their 
power in a reform scenario. Option (b) is 
forced unification following military victory of 
one side over the other. Due to the massive 
escalation risk (especially nuclear risk) 
associated with inter-Korean conflict, this 
option is a non-starter. Moreover, forced 
unification through conflict is also not the 
professed policy of either the current DPRK 
or the ROK. Option (c) is gradual and 
peaceful transition of one country’s systems 
toward those of the other. Although the 
mechanisms and institutions for accomplishing 
this are radically different for each side, this is 
actually the official position of both the 
DPRK and the ROK. However, this is also a 
nonstarter, as each government would demand 
that the other adopt its system as the 
unification end state. This would inevitably 
relegate one side’s elites to oblivion, and, as 
such, they would have no incentive to enter 
this unification path.  
 
Thus we are left with option (d), collapse of 
one side and attempted absorption by the 
other. Given the North's feeble political 
legitimacy and generally precarious situation 
(especially its horrendously maldeveloped 
economic fundamentals), most scenarios 
envision an abrupt collapse of the DPRK and 
its rapid absorption and unification on the 
South’s terms. There are other collapse 
possibilities of course—notably North Korean 
collapse and gradual absorption, as well as a 
one people/two states solution (something like 
Austria and Germany)—but they are generally 
considered unlikely.   
 
But does this schema not forget at least one 
possibility: that inertia prevails and North 
Korea continues on its path of economic 
maldevelopment and political repression? 
Predicting DPRK regime collapse is a fool's 
game, and in fact we have not seen mass elite 
defections or popular uprisings that reliably 
signal regime change in authoritarian states. 
But in addition to the long-term trend of 
decreasing regime control (i.e., tolerated 
marketization1 due to the futility of the public 
distribution system, loosened agricultural 
collectivization, and loss of the government's 
monopolistic control of information due to 
ICT and foreign media penetration into the 
formerly hermetic country), there are new 
reasons to think that the current regime has 
entered a particularly fragile period.  
 
SIGNS OF NORTH KOREAN REGIME 
FRAGILITY 
• The head of the vital Ministry of the 
People's Armed Forces has been changed 
five times during Kim Jong Un’s initial 
forty months as supreme leader. The 
current MPAF vice-minister has been 
promoted and demoted six times over the 
same period. Most recently, in May 2015, 
MPAF minister Hyon Yong Chol (Lt. 
Gen.) was purged for insubordination and 
executed (reportedly by an anti-aircraft 
battery, in front of other military members, 
as a warning to other would-be rebels). 
The MPAF is a significant bellwether 
because it is both immediately subordinate 
to the National Defence Commission 
(chaired by Kim) and responsible for many 
foreign currency earning operations, which 
are critical to funding the chronically 
penurious North Korean military (as well 
as the state and its leaders more generally). 
One possibility is that the regime faces 
discipline problems at the general officer 
level, which would likely endanger both 
regime/state security and crucial financial 
lifelines. But from a core regime elite 
perspective, an even scarier implication of 
the MPAF chaos is that the Organization 
and Guidance Department (OGD)—
which makes all senior-level civilian and 
military personnel appointments—might 
be factionalized or leaderless. In either 
case, that would imply weakness. The 
OGD is the most powerful institution in 
North Korea, and many DPRK analysts 
believe OGD weakness would be a prelude 
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to collapse.  
• DPRK state media reported in mid-June 
2015 that the country was facing the worst 
drought in a century. This is almost 
certainly an exaggeration, but the Korean 
peninsula is in fact facing a severe rainfall 
deficit, and the drought warning was likely 
both a pre-excuse for a poor harvest and a 
prelude to demanding international food 
assistance. UN and ROK estimates of the 
decline in the rice harvest range from 12%-
20%, with barley and potato yields down 
even more. Such a poor harvest situation 
represents a major problem for the 
Pyongyang regime, as North Korea is in 
some ways still an agrarian society1; has 
poor soil conditions, fertilizer access, and 
irrigation (and is thus inefficient even with 
favorable weather); and aspires to be 
largely self-reliant in food production 
(although the reality does not match the 
rhetoric of Juche ideology). Historically, 
when the North encounters severe food 
security problems, the regime makes 
various types of (more or less coercive) 
diplomatic overtures to international 
benefactors to extract food aid in order to 
placate the military/elites and survive long 
enough for conditions to improve. The 
North's capacity to successfully execute 
this tactic is increasingly unreliable, 
however, as we see in the following three 
points. 
• With no six-party talks and North Korea 
determined to never surrender its nuclear 
weapons, US de-nuclearization strategy for 
the peninsula has become co-terminous 
with regime change. No one seriously 
suggests fomenting revolution or war, but 
the US sees no hope in de-nuclearization 
through negotiations and its “strategic 
patience” policy is leading it to push the 
international community to continue 
tightening sanctions. The emphasis on 
coercion is not new, but previously its 
purpose was to force DPRK leaders to 
negotiate, whereas now the idea is to choke 
the regime until it falls. That will probably 
happen eventually because North Korea 
only has two possible responses. The first 
is the current, failing strategy—“byungjin” 
(“dual path”)—of simultaneous nuclear 
weaponization and economic growth. The 
second approach is reliance on allied 
benefactors… But… 
• The current regime in general, and Kim 
Jong Un in particular, appears to have 
increasingly poor relations with Russia and 
China. Kim committed a serious diplomatic 
faux pas when on short notice he 
inexplicably cancelled an agreed-upon trip 
to Moscow in May 2015 for the 70th 
anniversary of victory in WWII. Then in 
June he rebuffed a Chinese invitation to a 
similar celebration in Beijing scheduled for 
September 2015. This follows a two year 
period (since the 2013 DPRK nuclear test) 
of historically frigid relations between the 
North and China. Russia and China (to a 
greater extent) have functioned as the 
DPRK's traditional lifelines, so a 
breakdown in those relationships makes 
the regime more vulnerable to endogenous 
and exogenous shocks. 
• Western officials working on North 
Korean issues privately say that Kim Jong 
Un is either disinterested in/distracted 
from or very bad at diplomacy (or possibly 
both). One notes that Kim has not left the 
DPRK since his assumption of power in 
2011, not even to visit China. Although, on 
the one hand, his predecessors also 
sometimes isolated themselves from 
international interlocutors for long periods, 
it is also true, on the other hand, that 
fragile leaders do not engage in the luxury 
of diplomatic travel if they are afraid of a 
coup d'état. From a regime insider 
perspective, a more worrying problem than 
disinterest in/distraction from general 
diplomatic efforts may be that Kim does 
not seem to grasp how the North's 
distinctive, traditional coercive diplomacy 
works. Kim's father and grandfather 
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mastered the cycle of provocation ending 
in extracted concessions from the 
international community, and this has been 
crucial to regime survival. There is little to 
suggest that the unfortunate necessity for 
this strategem has changed, yet Kim does 
not seem to know how to follow the 
playbook. 
• As tawdry as it appears, Kim's poor health 
and significant weight gain since assuming 
power are risk factors for regime stability. 
His unexpected death would leave a power 
vacuum, or he may at some point become 
sick enough that his ability to govern is 
hindered, or his failing health may invite 
challenges to his authority from other 
DPRK regime elites. 
• Kim has carried out a major series of high-
level purges. Since taking power, nearly 
seventy high-ranking military officers, party 
cadres, and government officials have been 
executed, most notably Kim's uncle and 
regime number two Jang Song Thaek. And 
this is in addition to an unknown number 
of their lower level associates who were 
also purged and possibly executed. On the 
one hand, one could argue that the power 
necessary to carry out an operation of this 
scale implies strength. On the other hand, 
one could argue that the official reasons 
for the purges—insubordination, counter-
revolutionary factionalism, 
sedition/treason—indicate loyalty 
problems at the highest levels, and thus 
cracks in the regime. This is likely the case 
for the military, which has been hard-hit by 
the purges, and seems to have been 
downgraded relative to the State Security 
Department and the OGD. For a garrison 
state with a prominent songeun ("military 
first") ideology, this is a serious risk.1 
Whatever the underlying power 
configuration, Kim is a leader who cannot 
lead. This is dangerous in North Korea 
because its institutions breed so-called 
“lines.” “Lines” are patronage-driven 
factional lineages that support elite leaders. 
When elite leaders are purged, their “lines” 
are either purged also or have to find a new 
elite patron for protection. Unsurprisingly, 
purges also produce resentment and desire 
for revenge by disadvantaged “lines.” Kim 
Il Sung and Kim Jong Il knew how to 
handle this, but even they faced multiple 
assassination plots. Will the new supreme 
leader be as skilled? 
 
None of these risk factors mean that the North 
Korean regime will fall apart tomorrow, next 
week, next month, next year, or even next 
decade. But it does explain why the DPRK has 
a 94.3 rating on the Fragile States Index (on 
par with pillars of stability such as Mauritania 
and Liberia), why a recent Ilmin Institute 
survey of 135 DPRK experts estimated median 
regime lifetime at 10-20 years, and why (off-
the-record) government or government-
connected officials in several countries with 
interests in closely watching DPRK regime 
developments currently tend to argue that it 
will fall sooner rather than later. As one high-
ranking foreign policy official with an extensive 
North Korea portfolio recently put it in a 
closed-door meeting, all states with interests in 
Northeast Asia, and in particular the Korean 
peninsula, are being negligent if they are not 
crafting related policy with collapse in mind.  
 
SECURITY CONSEQUENCES OF REGIME 
COLLAPSE 
Indeed, DPRK collapse and peninsular 
unification would have a transformative effect 
on the Northeast Asian regional order, 
beginning with its alliance architecture. These 
geopolitical transformations would change the 
context in which polities, including those in 
Europe, approach relations to China and 
Russia (inter alia). And obviously there are risks 
involved. Notably China would be largely 
disadvantaged by the transformation, as it 
would suddenly have borders contiguous to 
territory that would be part of the US-Korea-
Japan constellation. It would thus likely adopt a 
different posture, given a realigned region in 
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which it were deprived of its buffer state. A 
distinct possibility is that China—defying both 
ROK and US desires—would work hard to 
undermine the North’s absorption. This would 
inherently destabilize a region in which the five 
major players (US, China, Korea, Japan, 
Russia) are all EU strategic partners and among 
its top eight trade partners. 
 
If a putative Chinese strategy of undermining 
Korean unification were to fail, China could be 
expected to use leverage in other places to 
maintain its interests. For example, it would 
compensate by exerting more pressure on 
Taiwan, the South China Sea, and disputed 
maritime territories such as the 
Senkaku/Diayou islands. These potential 
actions would affect global commons—e.g., 
sea lines of communication, or overflight 
rights—whose secure access is vital for 
Europe’s economy. At the very least such 
possibilities should, for example, lead to re-
examining how Europe prioritizes and handles 
its strategic partnerships in the region. 
 
Yet another scenario is that the current US-
ROK-Japan security alliance would not persist 
without the presence of North Korea. After all, 
the US-ROK alliance is primarily for DPRK 
deterrence, which would be unnecessary after 
unification.  Notably a unified Korea could 
theoretically gravitate more to China on 
security cooperation (reflecting the weight of 
their economic relationship). This specific 
scenario is unlikely, but at the least a more 
independent, “balancer-role” Korea could 
emerge. The dynamics of formal alliance 
dissolution would be unpredictable, but history 
shows that a Korea-Japan relationship without 
the US to enforce cooperation is fraught with 
conflict.  
 
Despite the human rights gains that one would 
hope and expect to see emerge from a defunct 
Kim regime, there are also security risks 
entailed in DPRK collapse. Most worrisome is 
WMD (especially nuclear) proliferation. A 
chaotic regime collapse would likely result in 
degraded control of NBCR weapons, which 
could then be the object of proliferation by 
disaffected or opportunistic members of the 
military, state security, or worker’s party. 
Scientists may also be a proliferation risk if a 
collapse situation renders their skills 
unmarketable domestically and they seek to sell 
their know-how internationally. Such 
possibilities are not only a general threat to 
global nonproliferation efforts, but also a 
specific threat to Europe’s security. One of the 
likely buyers of such goods and services would 
be violent extremist groups in Europe’s 
neighborhood, such as Daesh and Al Qaeda, 
both of which have followers within Europe. 
Let us not forget, after all, North Korea has 
already made inroads to the region: indeed it 
was covertly helping Syria build a nuclear 
reactor that Israel bombed in 2008. Other 
weapons clients have included Libya, Yemen, 
and Hezbollah, each of which has connections 
with DPRK military officers. 
 
Added to this overarching problem are many 
smaller security issues emanating from the 
possibility of North Korean regime collapse: 
small arms and light weapons could be shipped 
out of a failed DPRK to extremist groups from 
SE Asia to the MENA. In this eventuality, 
these groups’ improved materiel would hurt 
Europe’s ability to manage crises in its 
neighborhood. Increases in cyber-crime and 
cyber-terrorism would be probable. North 
Korea’s Bureau 121 has a contingent of 6,000 
cyber-warriors who, for example, crippled Sony 
Pictures in 2014 and carried out the 2013 
DarkSeoul attack that caused 700mnUSD in 
damage to South Korea’s economy (especially 
banks and media companies). Like the 
country’s nuclear scientists, they will be 
dramatically underemployed following a regime 
collapse, and thus incentivized to sell their 
black-hat abilities to unscrupulous entities 
interested in attacking European companies 
and governments. Notably, these Bureau 121 
cyber-warriors are frequently stationed 
 6 
 
internationally (in order to have easy, invisible 
access to servers), which means it will be 
difficult to identify and track them in the case of 
DPRK collapse.  
 
Trans-boundary health security would need to 
be improved in order to prevent pandemic 
breakout of infectious diseases with human 
reservoirs in the DPRK. A prominent example is 
xdr/mdr tuberculosis. About 3,500 annual cases 
are currently quarantined in North Korea, but in 
a chaotic situation they could cross borders, 
become disease vectors, and propagate to other 
regions, including Europe. Finally, there will be 
numerous humanitarian challenges falling under 
the rubric of human security (refugee crises, 
food shortages, gulag inmates facing execution 
by repressors seeking to destroy forensic 
evidence of crimes against humanity, etc.). 
Precisely the idea of filling such “security gaps” 
is one of the dominant themes of the EU’s 
security strategy.  
 
This is obviously not a comprehensive list of 
geopolitical and security challenges that might 
arise from a hypothetical DPRK collapse; nor is 
there room in this space to provide solutions. 
But these issues are possible events that 
European policy-makers should consider when 
reflecting on the evolution in Northeast Asia. 
Europe espouses a commitment to thinking 
strategically, and leading policy-makers will be 
drafting a new EU security strategy in the 
months to come. Although from a security 
standpoint Europe has a lot to deal with right 
now, and thus it may seem that North Korean 
collapse and peninsular unification are 
sufficiently distant scenarios that they do not 
deserve much attention, policy-makers should 
remember the following: strategy is about 
long-term thinking, thinking beyond the 
horizon and around the corner, establishing a 
solid context for reacting to unforeseen and 
unforeseeable events, if not shaping them 
yourself. Not doing so invites punishment by 
the inevitable changes of history itself. 
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